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1 Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
1997) establishes binding greenhouse gas (GHG) emission caps for a first commitment period 
(2008-2012). These emission caps apply to participating Annex B countries.1 It is expected 
that implementation of measures to meet these caps will result in spillover effects in non-
Annex B countries. One such effect is carbon leakage (or emissions leakage),2 which means 
that the environmental benefits of mitigation in some countries are to some extent offset by 
higher emissions in countries without binding caps on emissions.  
Carbon leakage occurs when there is a price differential (in actual prices or shadow prices) 
on GHG emissions between countries. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the price differential 
is brought about by abatement policies in Annex B countries that will create a significant and 
positive price on emissions, while the price on emissions in non-Annex B countries will be 
low (or zero, if no climate policies whatsoever are implemented). The imposition of emissions 
restrictions in Annex B countries therefore creates a relative price change that may provide 
sufficient incentives for industries (especially emissions intensive industries) to relocate from 
Annex B countries to non-Annex B countries, or that will reduce their competitiveness to the 
extent that their competitors in non-Annex B countries will increase their output (and 
emissions). As a result of this ‘leakage’, emissions in non-Annex B countries will be higher 
than they would have been without implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The consequence 
of carbon leakage is that the overall environmental effectiveness of the Protocol is reduced 
(and could, in principle, even be negative). Carbon leakage can of course also been seen as a 
problem of loss of investments and jobs in Annex B countries, but in this paper the focus will 
be on the environmental effects.  
Carbon leakage has been an important issue in the literature concerning the Kyoto Protocol 
as it implies that the environmental benefits of mitigation in some countries are offset by 
higher emissions in countries without binding caps (see for example Hourcade and Shukla 
2001; Sijm et al. 2004; Manne and Richels 1999). Sijm et al. (2004, p.12) defines carbon 
leakage as “the ratio of policy-induced increase of emission from a non-abating country over 
the reduction of emission by an abating country.” For the purposes of this paper it is 
necessary to adopt a more specific version of this definition: We will take “policy-induced” to 
mean any changes brought about as a result of the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
by “increase of emissions” we will understand ‘net increase in global emissions as compared 
to business-as-usual emissions in the absence of the Kyoto Protocol less the committed 
emissions reductions of the Annex B countries’.3  
Several studies have estimated the magnitude of carbon leakage using applied equilibrium 
models. Most of these studies estimate the global rate of carbon leakage to be between 5 and 
20 percent of the emissions reductions projected to be required by Annex B countries to meet 
1 The Annex B countries are the 39 industrialized countries with a quantified emission limitation listed in Annex B 
of the Kyoto Protocol. Of these, only countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol will be bound by the 
emissions caps. The United States and Australia have decided not to ratify. Annex 1 countries are the 36 countries 
listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC. Too avoid confusion we will always refer to Annex B and non-Annex B 
countries. Keep in mind that countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol do not belong to either group.  
2 In this paper we use the term carbon leakage although some of the literature (e.g., reports produced by the IPCC) 
uses the term emission leakage. Because emissions are usually quantified in CO2 equivalents, we find it most 
appropriate to use the term carbon leakage. 
3 One important reason for choosing net increase in global emissions rather than just increase in non-Annex B 
emissions is that the CDM allows a relocation of emissions between Annex B and non-Annex B countries; i.e. a 
decrease in non-Annex B countries that has a zero net effect globally. Furthermore, project-specific leakage under 
the CDM is included in and unambiguously accounted for under this definition of carbon leakage.  
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their Kyoto commitments (for an overview see Hourcade and Shukla 2001 or Sijm et al. 
2004). Some studies claim the global carbon leakage rate could be greater than 100%, in 
which case the Kyoto Protocol will lead to an overall increase in global emissions (see for 
example Babiker 2005). Studies that focus on endogenous technological development, on the 
other hand, find much lower – even negative – rates of carbon leakage (see Golombek and 
Hoel 2004; Di Maria and van der Werf 2005).  
In principle, any activity that reduces the price differential on emissions between Annex B 
and non-Annex B regions will decrease the magnitude of carbon leakage. The Kyoto Protocol 
allows use of three flexibility mechanisms to reduce the cost of meeting the emissions caps: 
International Emission Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC 1997). To the extent that use of these flexibility mechanisms 
reduces the cost of emissions in Annex B countries, they should also reduce carbon leakage to 
some extent (as this would reduce the price differential). Importantly, while IET between 
Annex B countries in principle equalizes carbon prices between the trading countries, the 
CDM will likely only reduce the price differential between the trading countries (Annex B 
and developing countries). See Kallbekken 2006 for a more comprehensive treatment of this 
issue.4
The CDM allows Annex B countries or firms in Annex B countries to generate Certified 
Emission Reduction units (CERs) by investing in projects that reduce emissions in non-
Annex B countries (UNFCCC 2005a). CERs generated under the CDM can be used by Annex 
B countries towards meeting their quantified emission reduction commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
The CERs generated by the project are calculated as the difference between a baseline and 
the (projected) actual emissions – adjusted for any leakage that may occur. UNFCCC (2005a, 
§44) defines the baseline for a CDM project activity as “the scenario that reasonably 
represents the emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of 
the proposed project activity”.  
The CDM rules state that leakage should be taken into account when establishing the 
baseline estimates (UNFCCC 2005a: §59). Leakage is defined as “the net change of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases which occurs outside the project 
boundary, and which is measurable and attributable to the CDM project activity” (UNFCCC 
2005a: §51). Several different types of leakage have been identified in the literature – though 
the focus is largely on positive leakages (i.e. increases in emissions). 
Receiving credits for emissions reductions that would have taken place even in the absence 
of the project constitutes project-specific leakage. Geres and Michaelowa (2002) present a 
framework to calculate project-specific leakage. 
In addition, there are two types of economic leakage (Vöhringer et al. 2006). Direct 
economic leakage relates to emissions associated with the production factors and intermediate 
deliveries demanded by the project. Market leakage refers to the indirect effects transmitted 
through price changes; for example that the project changes the relative prices of fossil fuels 
and thus cause other economic agents to change their production decisions (and emissions). In 
particular, the aggregate effect of the full portfolio of CDM projects on market prices can be 
significant enough to merit accounting for them. 
Vöhringer et al. (2006) claim that project-specific approaches fail to take account of market 
leakage, as they have been considered either unmeasurable or insignificant for individual 
projects. Vöhringer and his colleagues argue that the attribution of market leakage to projects 
4 The CDM will reduce rather than equalize the price of emissions because not all profitable projects will be 
implemented (participation will not be 100%), and because transaction costs are expected to be significantly higher 
for the CDM than for IET.  
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requires a theory that establishes a link between a project and the changes in GHG emissions 
that occur outside the project boundary.5 They argue that aggregated market leakage effects 
can be attributed proportionally to individual projects.  
Carbon leakage is an important issue because it may to some extent compromise the 
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. The magnitude of carbon leakage is 
determined by the price differential on emissions. The CDM has the potential to significantly 
reduce this differential. Given this, the CDM should have a potential to significantly reduce 
carbon leakage (Kallbekken 2006). While most studies focus on the positive leakage effects 
of CDM projects, this mechanism suggests that the overall (market) effect of CDM projects 
may in fact result in negative leakage. To what extent this potential can be realized depends, 
however, on the baseline methodology. Specifically, it depends on how the methodology 
accounts for the overall effect of all CDM projects on carbon leakage. This should be 
accounted for as the baseline is supposed to represent what emissions would have been in the 
absence of the specific project; but not in the absence of other CDM projects. The research 
question we attempt to answer in this paper is: Whether - and how - the aggregate market 
leakage effects of other CDM projects should be accounted for in the CDM baseline 
methodology.  
In Section 2 of this paper we provide a theoretical analysis of the influence of different 
baseline methodologies on the potential for the CDM to reduce carbon leakage, highlighting 
the intuition behind this study. These interactions are then examined quantitatively using a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with different cases representing the different 
baseline methodologies. The model is described in section 3, and we report our findings in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Accounting for carbon leakage in the CDM baseline 
methodology 
Carbon leakage is caused by the price differential on emissions that will arise between the 
Annex B and the non-Annex B countries with implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This 
dynamic is illustrated in Figure 1. In the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario with no Kyoto 
Protocol, global emissions are assumed to be 100 units. 70 of these units are emitted in Annex 
B countries, while 30 are emitted in non-Annex B countries. Assume that under the Kyoto 
Protocol (without the CDM) the Annex B countries are committed to reducing their emissions 
to 60 units. This reduction of 10 units will be the basis for calculating carbon leakage 
throughout all the examples. Because of carbon leakage emissions in non-Annex B countries 
rise to 35 units (as shown in the second set of bars). Global emissions are then 95 units. This 
would correspond to carbon leakage of 50% (an increase of 5 units in non-Annex B countries 
over a decrease of 10 units in Annex B countries).  
 
 
 
 
5 According to UNFCCC (2005: §52) a project boundary “shall encompass all anthropogenic emissions by sources 
of greenhouse gases under the control of the project participants that are significant and reasonably attributable to 
the CDM project activity”. 
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KP w/o CDM 
 
KP w/ CDM BAU
Figure 1: Emissions levels in Annex B and non-Annex B countries in 2010 under 
BAU and the Kyoto Protocol with and without CDM implementation. 
 
The actual magnitude of carbon leakage will stand in some direct relationship to the size of 
the price differential: a higher differential will increase the competitive advantage of non-
Annex B countries and thus also increase carbon leakage. The CDM, by reducing the price of 
emissions in Annex B countries (and slightly increasing the price in non-Annex B countries), 
will reduce also the magnitude of carbon leakage to non-Annex B countries, and improve the 
environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. In the example in Figure 1, the 
introduction of the CDM means that some Annex B countries purchase emissions credits from 
CDM projects. In the figure we assume this allows the Annex B countries to increase their 
emissions by 2 units as compared to the situation without the CDM. The emissions are 
reduced correspondingly in the non-Annex B countries through CDM projects.6 But, beyond 
this relocation of emissions, emissions in non-Annex B countries are reduced by a further 2 
units because, as the CDM project has decreased the international permit price, the price 
differential is smaller. Carbon leakage is now reduced to only 3 units (30%). 
The issue we are interested in is how (and whether) this effect will be accounted for in 
CDM project baselines. We will consider three alternative ways of accounting for leakage in 
order to examine the issue in detail. First, however, it is necessary to say a little more about 
how the CDM rules on baseline methodology (and accounting for leakage) should be 
interpreted in this context.  
Paragraph 46 of UNFCCC (2005a) states that the baseline “may include a scenario where 
future anthropogenic emissions by sources are projected to rise above current levels, due to 
the specific circumstances of the host Party.” This is interpreted here as implying that the 
baseline may first of all account for expected increases in emissions in the BAU scenario 
(economic growth), and secondly may also account for how carbon leakage increases these 
BAU emissions. It might not be obvious at first that the second type of accounting should be 
allowed, but consider that in the absence of the proposed CDM activity (which is the 
definition of the baseline); emissions would indeed increase due to carbon leakage (as 
compared to a world with no Kyoto Protocol). Thus, the positive carbon leakage induced by 
emissions restrictions in Annex B countries can be accounted for.  
6 In our illustrations we will for simplicity not include emissions in countries that are not parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
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Paragraph 47 (UNFCCC 2005a) states that “[t]he baseline shall be defined in a way that 
CERs cannot be earned for decreases in activity levels outside the project activity or due to 
force majeure.” This means that no CDM project should be able to claim credits for having 
reduced the carbon leakage through market prices.  
The combined effect of paragraph 46 and 47 is that the CDM should reduce carbon leakage 
as (1) projects are allowed to increase their baseline due to positive carbon leakage, but (2) 
are not allowed to claim credits for reductions in carbon leakage that they may induce by 
reducing the price differential between Annex B and non-Annex B countries.  
It is, however, not obvious that the full potential of this reduced carbon leakage will be 
realized in practice. The UNFCCC definition of the baseline implies that CDM projects 
should account for how their BAU emissions change as a result of other CDM projects being 
implemented. We will refer to the baseline that does account for such market leakage effects 
of other projects as the ‘correct’ baseline (i.e. what emissions would have been in the absence 
of this specific CDM project, but not in the absence of all CDM projects).  
However, none of the three allowed baseline methodologies that project participants can 
currently choose from seem to account for this effect, cf. UNFCCC 2005a §48: (a) Existing 
actual or historical emissions. (b) Emissions from a technology that represents an 
economically attractive course of action. (c) The average emissions of similar project 
activities undertaken in the previous five years.  
If the baseline methodology fails to account for how the aggregate market effects of other 
CDM projects can reduce carbon leakage, the result will be a type of project-specific leakage: 
Some proportion of the CERs generated are received for emissions reductions that occur 
thanks to the aggregate marked effects of other CDM projects – and thus would have taken 
place even in the absence of the specific project. This in turn means that some of the potential 
for the CDM to reduce carbon leakage will not be realized. It is important to point out that 
irrespective of how the baseline methodology accounts for it, carbon leakage to firms or 
industries that do not participate in the CDM will be reduced as the price differential is 
reduced. The issue of baseline methodologies therefore becomes more important the larger 
the share of firms that participate in the CDM.  
 
2.1 Baseline methodologies  
We will present three alternative baseline methodologies. These methodologies will be 
analyzed numerically in the modeling exercise in section 3. The first represents a baseline 
methodology that is fully consistent with the CDM rules. The other two are baselines that fail 
to account for the market leakage of other projects in different ways; one will produce 
project-specific leakage as discussed above, while the other baseline methodology will 
produce greater actual emissions reductions than the number of CERs received.  
(1) The first baseline methodology accounts for how other CDM projects reduce carbon 
leakage, and therefore uses the ‘correct’ baseline. With this methodology we expect that 
carbon leakage will be reduced more the higher the participation rate (when more firms 
participate) in the CDM. The reason is that the more CERs generated the lower the permit 
prices in the IET – the lower the carbon leakage. If this effect is accounted for, the baselines 
will be set at a lower level than otherwise, and the potential to reduce carbon leakage will be 
realized.  
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This is not to say that this baseline methodology is straightforward.7 To find the baseline 
we need to consider what emissions would have been if all projects – individually but 
simultaneously – took into account how their baseline depends on the other CDM projects 
that are implemented. This emissions level corresponds closely to what emissions would have 
been if all market prices were as if the CDM projects had been implemented.8 CERs are 
calculated as reductions below this baseline.  
An example is illustrated in Figure 2. In the example, total emissions in non-Annex B 
countries would be 3 units lower if all market prices were as if CDM projects had been 
implemented, than they would be under the Kyoto Protocol without the CDM. This is the 
amount by which the CDM reduces carbon leakage. This lower level of emissions should then 
be used as the baseline for CDM projects. Assume the participating firms reduce emissions 
from the baseline of 13 units to 11 units, and generate 2 CERs. If the effect of other projects 
on baseline emissions had not been accounted for, they would have received 4 CERs 
(compare emissions to 15 units under Kyoto Protocol without CDM). But because they do 
account for this effect, the CDM reduces carbon leakage from 50% (in the initial example) to 
20%.  
 
20
15 
Participating firms: 
 
Non-Participating firms: 
KP w/o CDM KP w/ CDM prices 
(hypothetical emissions)
KP w/ CDM
19
13 
19 
11
CDM Baseline 
CDM Reduction 2 CERs
 Figure 2: Non-Annex B emissions levels in firms participating and not participating 
in the CDM, and CER credits generated from ‘correct’ baseline methodology. 
  
(2) Our second baseline methodology represents a case where the carbon leakage induced 
by emissions restrictions in Annex B countries is accounted for in the baseline, but where 
how other CDM projects can offset this effect to some extent is not accounted for. The 
baseline for any given project is therefore fixed at some level that is independent of how 
many other CDM projects are carried out (and thus independent of how they may reduce 
carbon leakage). Figure 3 illustrates an example where firms participating in CDM generate 4 
CERs by reducing their emissions from a baseline of 15 units to 11 units. Emissions in the 
7 To find the appropriate baseline emissions we need to consider the case where the baseline for each project takes 
into account how the overall effect of all other CDM projects has changed market prices and thus changed market 
leakage and what the emissions for each activity would have been without the CDM project. The baseline is then 
endogenous with respect to the number of CERs generated overall - and the baseline influences the number of 
CERs generated.  
8 The correspondence is close but not perfect: The influence of other projects on the baseline of each project is 
accounted for, but so is the influence of the project on its own baseline. The latter influence will be minimal 
though if we can assume that each project is relatively small in proportion to the total volume of CDM projects.  
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non-participating firms are reduced by one unit due to less carbon leakage. This baseline 
methodology represent project-specific leakage as some of the credits are received for 
emissions reductions that would have taken place even without the project (the baseline used 
is higher than the ‘correct’ baseline). Carbon leakage is still reduced, from 50% to 40% – but 
it would have been reduced by a further 20% if the correct baseline had been used (where 
only 2 CERs would have been granted).  
 
17 
13 
60
31
Participating firms: 
 
Non-Participating firms: 
BAU KP w/o CDM KP w/ CDM
20
15
19 
11
CDM Baseline 
CDM Reduction 4 CERs
Figure 3: Non-Annex B emissions levels in firms participating and not participating in 
the CDM, and CER credits generated from a fixed baseline accounting for carbon 
leakage from Annex B. 
 
With this baseline methodology we expect the level of carbon leakage to be lower at higher 
rates of participation in the CDM: The emissions permit price in the international market will 
fall as a result of the increased generation of CERs, and this will in turn drive the reduction in 
carbon leakage. However, at some participation rate the trend will reverse and carbon leakage 
begin to increase as a function of increasing participation. This is because the CDM activity is 
reducing carbon leakage only in firms that do not participate in CDM projects themselves: 
once an activity implements a CDM project, the baseline is fixed to what it would have been 
in the absence of all CDM projects (as shown in Figure 3). As the subset of the economy 
participating in CDM grows, the share of the total emissions that are ‘locked-in’ to this fixed 
baseline grows, and the number of remaining non-participating firms (for whom carbon 
leakage can be reduced) shrinks. In the limit, where the participation rate in CDM countries is 
100%, there can be no reduction in carbon leakage in the CDM host country: only carbon 
leakage to countries not participating in the Kyoto Protocol will then be reduced.  
(3) The third and final case considers a baseline methodology with a fixed baseline, as in 
case 2, but where the baseline is equal to what the emissions would have been in the absence 
of the Kyoto Protocol (see Figure 4). In other words, how carbon leakage will increase the 
BAU emissions (the correct baseline) is not taken into account. In this case, CDM projects are 
in a sense required to ‘compensate’ for carbon leakage before being credited for emissions 
reductions. The example in Figure 4 illustrates that firms participating in the CDM receive 
only 1 CER credit when they reduce their emissions by 3 units (as compared to what they 
would have been with implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without the CDM). This 
‘shortfall’ is due to the fact that their baseline is set at 2 units lower than their emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol without the CDM. In this example carbon leakage is reduced from 50% to 
20%.  
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This baseline methodology represents an overall failure to account for carbon leakage: The 
positive carbon leakage resulting from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is not accounted 
for in the first place, and (consequently) neither are offsets in this carbon leakage resulting 
from implementation of other CDM projects. With this baseline methodology we again expect 
carbon leakage to be a uniformly decreasing function of an increasing participation rate: 
Increased participation will reduce the permit price and carbon leakage, and also, with 
increasing participation a greater share of emissions become locked-in to a baseline that is too 
low (lower than the correct baseline).  
 
17 
13 
60
Participating firms: 
 
Non-Participating firms: 
BAU KP w/o CDM KP w/ CDM
20
15
19 
CDM Baseline 
CDM Reduction 1 CER
12
Figure 4: Non-Annex B emissions levels in firms participating and not participating in 
the CDM, and CER credits generated using a fixed baseline not accounting for any 
carbon leakage 
2.2 How will carbon leakage be accounted for in practice? 
It is relatively straightforward to show how market leakage effects on the baseline should be 
accounted for in principle – or in a CGE model (as we will do soon). How to do it in practice 
is a far more complicated issue though. In our three idealized baseline methodologies we 
assume that we have perfect information – not only about the price elasticity in all relevant 
markets, but also about what all prices would have been in those hypothetical realities where 
there is no Kyoto Protocol or no CDM projects. The more relevant issue is – what information 
relevant to leakage is it likely that CDM project developers will have available, or will 
expend costs to obtain? 
It is difficult to account for the market leakage impact on baselines without employing 
some sort of partial or general equilibrium model. The first baseline methodology – which is 
consistent with the CDM rules - assumes that each project takes into account how changes in 
market prices brought about by all other CDM projects will influence their BAU emissions. 
Such an analysis would not necessarily have to be carried out by each project developer: It 
could also be done by the CDM Executive Board, which could then provide price estimates to 
project developers, or themselves make adjustments to the baselines of all projects. Vöhringer 
et al. (2006) argue that while project partners normally propose the baseline methodologies to 
the Executive Board, this would result in excessive transaction costs in this case. The leakage 
projections provided by the Executive Board would have to be updated if the assumed volume 
of CERs generated should deviate too far from the actual volume, thus ex-post adjustments 
might be required if one is to account for market leakage to the greatest extent possible and 
have a correct baseline.  
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Still, this would be a complex and potentially costly method for accounting for carbon 
leakage. One alternative – which would bring us somewhere between the two fixed price 
methodologies – would be to update baseline estimates using observed prices at regular 
intervals. This could be a practical alternative, and could potentially be an improvement on 
the CGE modelling approach (as CGE models will always be imperfect representations of the 
market).  
The other two baseline methodologies are strictly speaking not consistent with the 
UNFCCC definition of the baseline. They are incorrect because they do not reflect what 
emissions actually would have been in the absence of each specific CDM project; instead they 
reflect what emissions would have been with the Kyoto Protocol but without the CDM, and in 
the complete absence of the Kyoto Protocol, respectively. In other words neither baseline 
methodology takes into account how the CDM (as a whole and the project on its own) would 
have changed emissions (and thus the correct baselines) through market interactions. 
Yet, these other two methodologies are arguably realistic representations of the baseline 
methodologies actually being used: (1) Neither of these two baseline methodologies requires 
sophisticated analysis of leakage effects. (2) If current prices are being used to create a 
baseline, without any forecasting of how emissions trading and/or the CDM will change 
prices, project developers are using some sort of fixed baseline. (3) If current prices reflect 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol without the CDM (because emissions trading schemes 
are already in operation while relatively few CDM projects have been implemented), this 
baseline is equivalent to our second baseline methodology. (4) If current prices do not reflect 
how implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will change prices, because preparations for 
implementation have only just begun, then this baseline is equivalent to our third baseline 
methodology. The latter case might seem to be the most realistic as most Annex B countries 
have not yet implemented policies that are sufficiently strong to put them on a trajectory to 
meeting their commitments (thus current prices are closer to reflecting this reality). 
 
3 The model 
We use the DEEP CGE model to analyze the influence of the CDM on carbon leakage, and 
the implications of using different baseline methodologies. By using a CGE model we forego 
the opportunity of studying the CDM at the project level in favour of capturing the full global 
market effects of Kyoto Protocol implementation with the CDM.  
The DEEP model is a multi-sector and multi-region intertemporal computable general 
equilibrium model. The model was used in Kallbekken and Westskog (2005). A full 
description of the DEEP model, including assumptions on elasticities and the dynamics of the 
model, can be found in Kallbekken (2004). The model builds on the GTAP-EG model 
(Rutherford and Paltsev 2000), and uses the GTAP data base (Dimaranan and McDougall 
2006).  
For the purposes of this paper we use the time horizon 2001-2012 (annual steps). The 
sectors and regions are listed in table 1. Economic and emissions growth is assumed to follow 
the International Energy Outlook 2005 projections (EIA 2005). Both economic and emissions 
growth is moderate in mature market economies in this projection (though significantly 
higher for North America than for Europe and Asia), and high in emerging economies.  
We assume that IET will be an important measure for the Annex B countries in meeting 
their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. More specifically, we assume that the current 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme will be extended to include the aluminium and chemical 
sector by 2008. We assume that Russia will implement a somewhat more comprehensive 
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scheme than the EU in that it will also include other manufacturing and services.9 For the 
other Annex B countries we assume an emissions trading system similar to the EU ETS, but 
with emissions from the gas sector also included (such as Canada’s Large Final Emitters 
system does). For all Annex B countries we assume that only CO2 emissions are part of IET. 
Furthermore we assume that no hot air is sold on the market.10,11 For emissions not covered 
by the IET we assume other, but less stringent measures will be implemented. In the model 
this is done by establishing national ‘shadow’ emissions trading systems with an emissions 
reduction requirement only half as stringent as the IET (ratio of required cuts to BAU 
emissions is half as large as for sectors in the IET).  
Table 1: Regions and sectors in the model 
 
Region Sector 
  
Russia Refined petroleum 
Rest of Annex B Crude oil 
China Gas 
India Agriculture 
Brazil Energy intensive sectors 
Africa and Latin America Other manufacturing and services 
Asia Electricity 
Non-participating regions* Capital good 
• Predominantly the USA and Australia 
 
 
3.1 Modelling the CDM 
We have chosen to model the CDM as a mechanism conceptually equivalent to an emissions 
trading scheme: If we regard the BAU emissions of the non-Annex B countries as their 
baseline, then any reduction in emissions below this level can be regarded as generating CDM 
credits (see Kallbekken and Westskog 2005). The CDM does, however, differ from IET in 
three important respects; transaction costs, the participation rate, and having to establish a 
baseline. The cases representing different baseline methodologies are discussed in section 4.2. 
Finally, we assume that CDM projects can reduce emissions of CH4 and N2O as well as CO2.  
Many studies argue that the CDM is likely to entail larger transactions costs than emission 
trading (see for instance de Gouvello and Coto 2003, Jotzo and Michaelowa 2002, 
Michaelowa and Jotzo 2005 and Michaelowa et al. 2003). These larger costs are due to the 
fact that a credit trading mechanism, like the CDM, depends on a project specific analysis and 
                                                     
9 Whether Russia will actually implement an emissions trading system or whether Russia will instead focus on 
promoting JI projects in the same sectors has no numerical impact on our estimates (given our other assumptions).  
10 Hot air is the term used to describe the “excess” credits granted to economies in transition as a result of their 
actual emissions already being significantly below the agreed upon emissions cap when the Kyoto Protocol was 
negotiated.  
11 When the USA withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 “the EU, Japan and Canada declared that for 
environmental or other reasons they were not interested in buying up Russian "hot air".” (Egenhofer 2003).  
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a rigorous process of approval. In our model we impose CDM transaction costs of 20% – 
following Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005) where transaction costs account for 20% of the 
permit price for the marginal projects.12 In the sensitivity analysis we will show that using a 
fixed transaction cost, rather than a percentage premium, does not significantly change our 
conclusions. 
There are several barriers to CDM project development. These include very basic barriers 
such as lack of capacity to identify and assess potential projects in host countries, and lack of 
awareness of the CDM and its benefits amongst potential financers. Ellis et al. (2004) argue 
that these barriers also include financial and institutional barriers, risk and uncertainties 
associated with generating CERs, delays in approving CDM project activities and 
methodologies, and other barriers such as difficulties in matching potential projects with 
potential investors, or barriers for investment by non-domestic entities. In addition, Ellis and 
co-authors claim that capacity and institutional issues are significant barriers to a more 
widespread use of the CDM.  
Participation rate is the term we use to reflect the fact that, due to these various barriers, 
only some share of the potentially profitable CDM projects will be implemented. We define 
participation rate as the share of potentially profitable projects that is actually implemented. 
In the model we do this in a manner equivalent to how Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002) scale 
back their abatement cost curves (while we vary the percentage, they scale the curves back to 
10% of their economy-wide estimate).13  
3.2 Scenarios and cases 
We created three scenarios for this project. The first scenario, which we call No-Kyoto, is 
used to find what emissions would have been without implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
(i.e. to determine the magnitude of carbon leakage as a basis for calculations). The IET-only 
scenario is used to find the magnitude of carbon leakage with implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol (with international emissions trading), but without any CDM projects. The last 
scenario is the CDM scenario consisting of three different cases representing the three 
baseline methodologies introduced in the previous section: 
 
 
• In the updating case the baseline is updated with respect to how other projects 
affect the baseline for each project.14 This case is fully consistent with the CDM 
rules. 
• In the fixed baseline case the baseline for CDM projects is fixed with respect to 
what emissions would have been in the absence of all CDM projects. In other 
words there is no accounting for CDM leakage in this case, and there will thus be 
project-specific leakage. 
12 20% transaction costs is a relatively high estimate. A high estimate was chosen because other assumptions in the 
model may exaggerate the potential for CDM (having entire shares of the economy participation in the CDM 
implies that even the very smallest potentials will be made use of).  
13 As abatement costs are implicit in our model, we do not as such scale back abatement cost curves, but vary the 
share of total emissions that can participate in the CDM. 
14 In the model this is implemented through a stepwise procedure: In each step we increase the participation rate by 
1% to find out how this changes the business-as-usual emissions of the activities not taking part in the CDM. This 
emissions level is then used as the baseline in the next step for those firms that did not participate in the CDM in 
the previous step, but which are now assumed to participate.  
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• In the fixed no-Kyoto case the baseline is again fixed, but this time with respect to 
what emissions would have been in the absence of the Kyoto Protocol (and not just 
CDM projects). This baseline methodology fails to account for carbon leakage as 
such. 
 
4 Results 
Under the No-Kyoto scenario the emissions covered in the model are projected to grow to 
11.9 Gt Ce per year during the first commitment period.15,16 The Annex B countries are 
committed to reducing their emissions by a total of 445 Mt Ce per year, which corresponds to 
a 3.7% cut in global emissions as compared to the No-Kyoto scenario.  
In the IET-only scenario the permit price is $27.2/t Ce. This increase in the cost of 
emissions in Annex B countries results in an increase in emissions in non-Annex B and non-
participating countries of 28 Mt Ce per year. This corresponds to carbon leakage of 6.3%. 
Compared to other estimates in the literature (typically 5-20%) this is a relatively low 
estimate. There are two important reasons for this. First, our estimated permit price is 
relatively low – thus producing small incentives to shift production (IPCC 2001 reported a 
range of permit prices for Annex B only emissions trading of $14-224/t Ce, with an average 
of $77/t Ce). Second, capital is region specific in our model and this might result in some 
underestimation of carbon leakage.  
4.1 Results for the CDM scenario 
Under all three cases with CDM activities the volume of CDM sales increase and the IET 
permit price decreases significantly as the participation rate increases (see figures 5 and 6). 
The permit price that is $27.2 with 0% participation (equivalent to the IET-only scenario) is 
roughly halved if the participation rate is 10% instead. CDM volumes climb from 0 to 100 Mt 
Ce/year as the participation rate increases from 0 to 10%, and levels off around 250 Mt 
Ce/year as the participation rate approaches 100%. Thus our scenarios suggest a theoretical 
potential for CDM sales (unrealistic though it may be) where the CDM would be responsible 
for more than half of the emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The fixed no-Kyoto and updating cases follow each other very closely both in terms of 
permit prices (the difference is never more than $0.1) and CDM sales (the difference is never 
more than 1%). Furthermore these differences diminish with an increasing participation rate 
(see Figure 5 and 6). The reason is that the fixed no-Kyoto baseline corresponds to BAU 
emissions at a permit price of zero, and the updating baseline corresponds to BAU emissions 
at a permit price that is declining fast and reaching very low levels with an increasing 
participation rate.  
The results for the fixed baseline case diverge only marginally from the other two. With 
low participation rates the differences are minor. At higher participation rates the differences 
become more pronounced: With a 20% participation rate the permit price is more than 3% 
lower in the fixed baseline case than in the other two (that have identical permit prices at this 
participation rate). The volume of CERs generated is about 1.5% greater. The most dramatic 
differences between this and the other two cases are, however, in their impact on carbon 
15 Ce is short for carbon equivalents; i.e. emissions of all gases converted to equivalent emissions of carbon using 
Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) with a 100-year time horizon.  
16 Whenever emissions are reported on a per year basis this refers to the annual average of the five years of the first 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.  
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leakage: At 20% participation carbon leakage is reduced to 1.85% under the fixed baseline 
case, versus around 0.9% in the other two cases. At a 95% participation rate carbon leakage 
has climbed back up as high as 5.1% for the fixed baseline case, while it is virtually 
eliminated at 0.14% in the updating case and 0.38% in the fixed no-Kyoto case (see figure 7).  
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Figure 5: Permit price ($2001/t Ce by participation rate) 
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Figure 6: CDM volume (Mt Ce/year by participation rate) 
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In all three cases a higher participation rate will produce lower permit prices and generate 
more CDM credits. As we have already seen, carbon leakage does also change with the 
participation rate, but these results are not quite as straightforward – as figure 7 shows. The 
different ways of setting the baseline produce diverging estimates of carbon leakage. In 
section 2.1 we discussed briefly why and how we expected each type of market leakage 
accounting to influence the carbon leakage depending on the participation rate.  
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Figure 7: Carbon leakage (per cent by participation rate) 
 
For the updating case we expected to see a uniformly decreasing rate of carbon leakage. 
We do see a strong decrease, from 6.3% to a minimum of less than 0.06% (where emissions 
in developing countries are actually lower than they would have been in absence of the Kyoto 
Protocol). However, the leakage is not uniformly decreasing with an increasing participation 
rate as the leakage does start to climb slowly at higher rates. This is possibly an artefact of 
how the updating case is implemented in the model.17  
In the fixed baseline case the carbon leakage initially drops rapidly, from 6.3% at 0% 
participation to a minimum of 1.8% leakage at 25% participation. This is the result of a 
decreasing price differential. But – for higher participation rates carbon leakage increases 
slowly with an increasing participation rate. The reason for this is that while the ever 
decreasing permit price will always tend to reduce carbon leakage, there is also more project-
specific leakage as the share of emissions participating in CDM projects increases: At 100% 
participation all emissions in developing countries are tied to a baseline that does not account 
for carbon leakage (thus a baseline that is too high), CDM projects then simply relocate 
                                                     
17 In the step-wise procedure only the emissions for the share of emissions that is not taking part in the CDM can 
actually be updated for each step. This means that as this share gets ever smaller at higher participation rates, a 
larger share of emissions get “locked in” and are not updated from step to step.  
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emissions between Annex B and non-Annex B countries, and only emissions in non-
participating countries will be reduced as a result of the CDM.  
In the fixed no-Kyoto case carbon leakage decreases rapidly with increasing participation as 
an increasing share of emissions becomes ‘locked-in’ to a low baseline - and as the increasing 
number of CERs generated brings down the permit price and hence also carbon leakage. At 
100% participation all emissions in developing countries would in effect be capped with no 
carbon leakage (total leakage stays above 0% only because of leakage to non-participating 
countries). This is the result that was predicted and explained in section 2.1 (case 3).  
It is difficult to assess up front what would be a realistic participation rate. A rate of 10% 
gives a volume of CDM sales (102-113 Mt Ce/year across cases) roughly consistent with the 
estimate by Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005) (99 Mt Ce/year).18 This might seem high in light of 
the number of CDM projects currently in the pipeline - reported by CDM Watch (2005) to be 
18-29 Mt Ce/year.19 The participation rate that is consistent with such a volume of CDM sales 
is below 2%. It is, however, possible that this just indicates a slow start for the CDM. New 
rules adopted by COP/MOP1 in Montreal (UNFCCC 2005b) that open the door for a broader 
range of CDM projects that are not strictly project based can be expected to increase the 
participation rate.  
In table 2 we present emissions (Mt Ce/year) for all our scenarios and cases, using a 10% 
participation rate for the three CDM cases. The numbers show that at what might be a realistic 
participation rate (realistic number of CERs generated), carbon leakage can be reduced by 
more than one half from what it would have been without the CDM. 
  
Table 2: Annual emissions and carbon leakage (Mt Ce) under the five scenarios and 
cases (with 10% participation rate in the three cases).  
 BAU No CDM CDM cases
Region No-Kyoto IET-only Updating Fixed baseline Fixed no-Kyoto 
Annex B 3653.7 3209.2 3209.2 3209.2 3209.2 
China 2160.7 2166.9 2159.7 2160.4 2159.8 
India 668.5 670.0 669.4 669.4 669.3 
Brazil 164.8 165.4 165.4 165.4 165.3 
Asia 1451.8 1457.8 1454.7 1455.0 1454.4 
Africa and Latin America 1770.2 1777.8 1773.4 1773.8 1773.1 
Non-participating regions 2426.2 2432.3 2430.4 2430.4 2430.5 
Change from no-Kyoto - -416.6 -433.5 -432.1 -434.2 
Total carbon leakage - 27.9 10.9 12.3 10.2 
Leakage (%) - 6.3 % 2.5 % 2.8% 2.3% 
 
 
                                                     
18 In their study Michaelowa and Jotzo scaled back the abatement cost curves to 10%. Thus, in one sense this 
might not have any significance beyond showing that we arrive at the same volume of CDM sales when we use a 
similar participation rate even if we use a rather different model.  
19 CDM Watch (2005) provides a low estimate of 328 million CERs in pipeline, and a high estimate of 530 million 
CERs. These numbers were converted to Ce and divided by the 5 years of the first commitment period.  
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4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
There are many assumptions that need to be made to undertake any CGE analysis, and these 
can potentially have a significant bearing on the results. Results already presented show that 
changes in the assumptions on participation rate and baseline methodology can have a 
significant influence. A sensitivity analysis conducted on two other important assumptions 
seems to indicate that the main results are robust across other assumptions: 
We use transaction cost of 20% of total cost of CDM permits in the standard scenarios. It is 
not clear whether using a fixed share of costs or whether using a fixed cost is the most 
appropriate way to represent transaction costs. We have therefore run two of our cases (fixed 
baseline and updating) with a fixed $1/t CO2 (or $3.7 per t Ce) transaction cost (Chen 2003). 
The effect this has on carbon leakage can be seen in figure 8 (where the results for the 
standard assumption also appear for comparison). For both cases using the $3.7 transaction 
costs results in slightly lower leakage rates for low participation rates (less than 0.1% lower), 
and somewhat higher carbon leakage for higher participation rates. The intuition behind this 
is simple: Carbon leakage is determined by the international permit price. $3.7 is less than 
20% of the permit price as long as permit prices are higher than $18, thus making CDM 
credits cheaper and thus reducing carbon leakage somewhat more. For permit prices below 
$18 a fixed $3.7 premium on CDM credits increases the permit price (quite substantially at 
high participation rates).  
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Figure 8: Carbon leakage under sensitivity analysis and with standard assumptions 
The assumption regarding how much hot air is sold could also have a significant influence 
on the results. If we relax the assumption that no hot air is sold by instead assuming that 
Russia will sell 50% of its hot air, this results in a dramatic drop in permit prices (to $14.1 as 
compared to $27.2 at 0% participation in the standard scenarios). The volume of CDM sales 
stays at around 2/3 of the level for the standard assumptions. This means that the initial 
carbon leakage is much lower, and it is reduced even further as permit prices are extremely 
low. However, the shape of the curves is the same as in the standard scenarios.  
CICERO Working Paper 2006:03  
 CDM baseline methodologies and carbon leakage 
 
 
 
 
17
The sensitivity analysis indicates that our main results are relatively robust. The exact 
estimates for the permit prices or CDM volumes may change, but the structure of the 
interaction between baseline methodologies, participation rate and carbon leakage remains the 
same (all curves still have the same basic shapes).  
5 Conclusions 
The CDM has the potential to significantly reduce international emissions trading permit 
prices and thus also to significantly reduce the magnitude of carbon leakage under realistic 
assumptions (Kallbekken 2006). In this paper we have analyzed how the choice of CDM 
baseline methodologies can influences to what extent this potential will be realized. This 
paper does not analyse the role of technology spillovers due to CDM projects. Also, we have 
not considered how incentives by both host and investor to overstate the emissions reductions 
achieved by a CDM project might pull the results in the opposite direction (see for example 
Michaelowa and Dutschke 1999).  
Our estimate of carbon leakage (without CDM) is relatively low (estimates in the literature 
typically range from 5 to 20%). If carbon leakage is small, the problem is not critical with 
respect to environmental effectiveness - or competitiveness effects - and the issue of to what 
extent the CDM can reduce it becomes less relevant. If, however, carbon leakage should turn 
out to be a significant issue, then the CDM – and how baselines are established – becomes a 
concern. In fact, most other studies find higher rates of carbon leakage than we do.  
The contribution of this paper is to show how important it is to account for market leakage 
effects in the CDM baseline methodology; the CDM has the potential to reduce carbon 
leakage significantly, but this potential may not be realized unless carbon leakage is 
accounted for appropriately.20 Using the methodology most consistent with the CDM rules 
(the updating baseline), carbon leakage is reduced significantly with increasing participation 
rates. It is, however, not clear that this is the methodology that will be used in practice: It 
requires at least regular updating of observed market prices – possibly CGE modelling tools, 
while the two alternative baseline methodologies are much less demanding as current prices 
can be used to estimate the baseline. However, unless the amount of CERs generated should 
be significantly greater than expected today, carbon leakage will be reduced under all three 
baseline methodologies considered here: At a 10% participation rate carbon leakage is 
reduced by between two thirds and one half.  
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